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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court in BMW v. Gore1 announced three “guideposts” 
for reviewing whether the amount of a punitive damages award is so 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.  B.A., University 
of Virginia; J.D., Yale Law School. 
 1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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excessive as to violate due process: the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, the ratio between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages,2 and the difference between punitive damages and civil and 
criminal penalties for comparable misconduct.3  Recently, in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,4 the Supreme Court 
elaborated on all three guideposts.  With respect to reprehensibility, it 
discussed limits on the power of courts to consider conduct by the 
defendant other than the conduct that harmed the plaintiff.5  Of the ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages, the Court stated that “few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio . . . to a significant degree, will 
satisfy due process.”6  It added that “[w]hen compensatory damages are 
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory 
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”7  
As for the third Gore guidepost, the Court in Campbell discounted the 
relevance of comparing punitive damages to criminal sanctions for 
comparable conduct.8 
This article focuses on the third guidepost, specifically, comparison to 
criminal sanctions.9  Part I of the article examines the Supreme Court’s 
language in several cases about the relevance of criminal sanctions to the 
question whether a punitive award is constitutionally excessive.  It 
criticizes the Campbell effort to distinguish between civil and criminal 
penalties under the third guidepost.  Part II suggests that the third 
guidepost, in theory, wrongly constrains courts from imposing sanctions 
 
 2. Although it is common to refer to the ratio between punitive damages and 
“compensatory damages,” the Supreme Court repeatedly has referred not only to the 
ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages, but also to the disparity 
between punitive damages and actual harm or potential harm to the plaintiff.  See, e.g., 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (stating that Gore 
instructs courts to consider “the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered 
by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004); 
Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 582–83; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 
459–62 (1993) (holding that a ratio of ten times the potential harm to plaintiffs was not 
so “grossly excessive” as to violate due process, although it was 526 times greater than 
the actual damages awarded by the jury).  For further discussion of how courts have 
considered plaintiff harm in comparison to the amount of punitive damages, see Colleen 
P. Murphy, The “Bedbug” Case and State Farm v. Campbell, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 579, 586–91 (2004). 
 3. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–83. 
 4. 538 U.S. 408 (2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004). 
 5. Id. at 419–24. 
 6. Id. at 425. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 428. 
 9. See also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Selective Due Process: The United States 
Supreme Court Has Said That Punitive Damages Awards Must Be Reviewed for 
Excessiveness, but Many Courts Are Failing to Follow the Letter and Spirit of the Law, 
82 OR. L. REV. 33, 48–61 (2003) (discussing court applications of the third guidepost). 
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above those created by the legislature and fails to recognize that the 
conduct addressed by a punitive award may be more blameworthy than 
that addressed by an applicable statute.  Part III considers how comparisons 
to criminal sanctions have influenced constitutional review of punitive 
awards in the lower courts, both before and after Campbell.  Aside from 
a few post-Campbell courts that have deemed comparison to criminal 
sanctions no longer relevant,10 lower courts have approached comparisons 
to criminal sanctions in a variety of ways, with some considering the 
possibility of imprisonment and others emphasizing fines.11  Although 
the third guidepost theoretically creates limits on the amount of punitive 
awards, courts commonly have approved punitive awards far in excess 
of criminal fines for comparable misconduct.12  This calls into question 
whether the third guidepost has much practical effect.  I conclude with 
the suggestion that although there may be theoretical and practical 
reasons to dispense with the third guidepost, as long as the Supreme 
Court continues to require its use, comparisons to criminal sanctions 
should be as relevant to constitutional review as civil sanctions. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENTS OF COMPARISONS TO 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
A.  Pre-Campbell Conceptions of Comparisons to                              
Criminal Sanctions 
The Supreme Court first reviewed whether a punitive award might 
violate due process in 1990, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haslip.13  In upholding the $1 million award at issue in the case, the 
Haslip Court commented that although the punitive damages far 
exceeded the statutory fine that could be imposed for comparable 
misconduct, “[i]mprisonment . . . could also be required of an individual 
in the criminal context.”14  In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court 
 
 10. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 66–67 & 83–101 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 68 & 85 and accompanying text. 
 13. 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“[U]nlimited jury discretion—or unlimited judicial 
discretion for that matter—in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results 
that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.”). 
 14. Id. at 23  (upholding a $1 million award in punitive damages for insurance 
fraud, more than four times the amount of compensatory damages).  Prior to Haslip, 
Justice O’Connor had advocated review of punitive awards for unconstitutional 
excessiveness, suggesting that “because punitive damages are penal in nature, the court 
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stated that a grossly excessive punitive damages award would violate 
due process,15 but it was not until Gore that the Court found a specific 
award to have been unconstitutionally excessive.16  The Court invalidated 
a $2 million punitive award against BMW for not disclosing that a car that it 
had represented as “new” had in fact been repainted. 
Stating that “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional 
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the severity 
of the penalty that a State may impose,” the Court found that BMW had 
not received fair notice of the “magnitude of the sanction” that could be 
imposed for its conduct.17  In concluding that the punitive award against 
BMW was grossly excessive, the Court referenced “the degree of 
reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the disparity between the harm or 
potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and his punitive damages 
award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”18  The Court then discussed 
each of these three guideposts in turn, finding that the guideposts did not 
support the amount of punitive damages awarded in the case.19 
In a section entitled “Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct,” the 
Court phrased the third guidepost as a comparison between “the punitive 
damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed 
for comparable misconduct.”20  By including comparison to criminal 
 
should compare the civil and criminal penalties imposed” in the jurisdiction and elsewhere.  
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  She also asserted that in considering 
criminal penalties, “the court should consider not only the possible monetary sanctions, 
but also any possible prison term.”  Id. 
 15. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–58 (1993). 
 16. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996) (finding violative 
of due process a $2 million punitive award when the plaintiff had incurred only $4000 in 
actual damages, and comparable civil penalties authorized by statutes were far less than 
the punitive award). 
 17. Id. at 574. 
 18. Id. at 574–75. 
 19. Id. at 574–85.  Stating that “[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct,” the Court observed that BMW’s conduct was not particularly 
reprehensible.  Id. at 575–80.  Second, as the plaintiff’s compensatory award was only 
$4000, the Court indicated that the 500 to 1 ratio between punitive damages and 
compensatory damages supported the conclusion that the punitive award was 
unconstitutionally excessive.  Id. at 580–83. 
 20. Id. at 583.  At the end of the “Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct” section, 
Gore pursued a line of inquiry distinct from the third guidepost.  The Court commented 
that “[t]he sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground that it was 
necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less drastic remedies 
could be expected to achieve that goal.”  Id. at 584.  This seems to impose on reviewing 
courts an obligation to inquire whether a lesser award could produce the desired level of 
deterrence, but it does not directly implicate a comparison to civil or criminal sanctions 
for similar conduct. 
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penalties, this language differs from the earlier and more specific language 
in the decision that referred only to “civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.”21  The Court’s earlier language focusing on civil penalties 
in comparable cases was, however, specific to the award against BMW; on 
the facts of the case, there were no comparable criminal sanctions. 
The Supreme Court stated that a court reviewing a punitive award for 
unconstitutional excessiveness should “‘accord ‘substantial deference’ to 
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at 
issue.’”22  The Court noted that Haslip had compared punitive damages 
to criminal legislative sanctions, including imprisonment.23 
Applying the third guidepost to the $2 million punitive award against 
BMW, the Court found that the award was “substantially greater than the 
statutory fines” available in the state and elsewhere for similar conduct.24  
It concluded that the comparable statutes did not provide “fair notice” 
that the offender might be subject to a multimillion dollar penalty.25  The 
Court added that “there does not appear to have been any judicial 
decision in Alabama or elsewhere indicating that [BMW’s conduct] 
might give rise to such severe punishment.”26  At the end of the opinion, 
 
 21. Id. at 575. 
 22. Id. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 23. Id. at 583 & n.38. 
 24. Id. at 584. 
 25. Id.  The Court observed: “The maximum civil penalty authorized by the 
Alabama Legislature for a violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices Act is $2,000; other 
States authorize more severe sanctions, with the maxima ranging from $5,000 to 
$10,000.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 26. Id.  An important issue arising from this language and the Gore language of 
“civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases” is whether the third 
guidepost encompasses comparison to punitive damages imposed in other cases.  Several 
lower courts since Gore have interpreted the third guidepost to require comparison to 
other punitive awards.  See, e.g., DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187–89 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that comparable criminal penalty of $1000 could not have provided fair notice of 
a $1.275 million award, but comparing punitive award to punitive damages awarded in 
other police misconduct cases and concluding that “a punitive damages award of 
$75,000 more accurately reflects the severity of [the defendant’s] acts under the Gore 
guideposts”); Dunn v. Vill. of Put-in-Bay, No. 3:02CV7252, 2004 WL 169788, at *3 
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2004) (comparing compensatory and punitive damages awarded in 
excessive force cases to awards in cases involving Fourth Amendment violations); Waits 
v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 4010, 2003 WL 21310277, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 
2003) (examining punitive awards in other cases as part of the third guidepost); Willow 
Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A 00-5481, 2003 WL 21321370, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. May 30, 2003) (“Because attorney’s fees are authorized by [state bad faith 
statute]—and have been granted in amounts roughly equal to the punitive damages 
award in this case—the relevant considerations under the third guidepost also support the 
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the Court commented that it did not accept the conclusion of the state 
supreme court that “BMW’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify 
a punitive sanction that is tantamount to a severe criminal penalty.”27  
This comment that the punitive award was tantamount to a severe criminal 
penalty was unexplained; Campbell, as will be discussed, more strongly 
equated excessive punitive awards to criminal penalties. 
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,28 the Court 
seemingly narrowed the third guidepost.  The Court stated that Gore had 
required consideration of “the difference between the punitive damages 
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.”29  The Court did not mention comparison to criminal 
penalties.30  The Cooper Court cited the early passage in Gore that 
summarized why the specific award against BMW was grossly 
excessive.31  It is unclear whether the omission of criminal penalties in 
Cooper was purposeful or an oversight.  In Campbell, however, the 
Supreme Court reintroduced the notion of comparing a punitive award to 
criminal penalties. 
 
imposition of the $150,000 award.”); Sufix, U.S.A., Inc. v. Cook, 128 S.W.3d 838, 842–
43 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (making comparison of punitive damages awards in other 
products liability cases); Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, No. 13-01-009-CV, 2003 
WL 21982181, at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2003) (mem.) (“Judicial decisions at the 
time of the misconduct are relevant under Gore’s third prong to ascertain whether a 
defendant had notice that its misconduct could subject it to a large punitive damages 
award.”); Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, 839 A.2d 682, 700 (D.C. 2003) (comparing punitive 
award to an award in a similar workplace discrimination case). 
Thorough examination of whether the third guidepost requires comparisons to other 
punitive damages is beyond the scope of this article, but I offer a few comments.  Gore 
did not link its comment on judicial decisions to its more substantial discussion of 
deference to legislative judgments.  Moreover, it is not clear from the context whether 
“judicial decisions” encompasses only cases imposing legislative sanctions or includes as 
well cases imposing punitive damages.  In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), the Supreme Court declined to require that an award of 
punitive damages be compared to punitive awards in analogous cases, although it 
commented that such a comparative approach might be permissible.  Id. at 458–59 
(plurality opinion).  In its fleeting reference to judicial decisions, Gore did not mention 
TXO.  Finally, the Gore comment on the absence of judicial decisions giving notice 
leaves unanswered whether the presence of judicial decisions imposing substantial 
punitive damages would support the constitutionality of a punitive award, even when 
comparable legislative sanctions are far less substantial. 
 27. Gore, 517 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added). 
 28. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).  It is in this case that the Supreme Court held that federal 
appellate courts should apply a de novo standard when reviewing a district court’s 
determination of the constitutionality of a punitive award.  Id. at 436. 
 29. Id. at 440. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75). 
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B. The Campbell Commentary on Comparisons to                            
Criminal Sanctions 
Campbell involved claims against State Farm of fraud, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith refusal to settle within 
insurance policy limits.32  After finding that the $145 million punitive 
award was disproportionate to the $1 million compensatory award, the 
Court turned to the third guidepost.  It quoted the narrow Gore language 
about comparisons to civil penalties,33 but it added: “We note that, in the 
past, we have also looked to criminal penalties that could be imposed.”34  
For this statement, the Court cited the language in Gore referencing 
comparison to both civil and criminal penalties, and it cited Haslip.35  
Commenting that it “need not dwell long on this guidepost,” the Court 
found that the $145 million punitive award against State Farm “dwarfed” 
the maximum $10,000 civil penalty for comparable misconduct.36  The 
Court added that the state supreme court’s speculation about possible 
imprisonment and other sanctions should be discounted because it was 
based on evidence of out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.37  Shortly after 
asserting that the $145 million punitive award dwarfed the maximum 
$10,000 civil penalty for comparable misconduct, Campbell stated that 
application of the three Gore guideposts to the facts of the case “likely 
would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of 
compensatory damages,” which was $1 million.38 
The Supreme Court thus indicated approval of a possible punitive 
award that would be 100 times the maximum civil penalty for comparable 
misconduct, although it remanded the case to the Utah Supreme Court 
for calculation of punitive damages in the first instance.39  This starkly 
raises the question whether the third guidepost has practical significance 
 
 32. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412–15 (2003), 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004). 
 33. Id. at 428 (citing the narrow passage in Gore, 517 U.S. at 575); see also id. at 418. 
 34. Id. at 428. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 429. 
 39. Id.  On remand, the Utah Supreme Court held, contrary to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s suggestion that the punitive damages award be at or near the amount of 
compensatory damages, that the insurer’s conduct warranted punitive damages of nine 
times the amount of compensatory and special damages, for a total punitive award of 
$9,018,780.75.  Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2004 WL 
869188, at *10 (Utah Apr. 23, 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004). 
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when the amount of punitive damages is permissible under the first and 
second guideposts.  
On the facts of Campbell, the Supreme Court did not find any criminal 
sanctions to be relevant.  The Court, however, took the opportunity to 
minimize the usefulness of comparison to criminal penalties.40  It 
asserted: 
The existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with 
which a State views the wrongful action.  When used to determine the dollar 
amount of the award, however, the criminal penalty has less utility.  Great care 
must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal penalties that 
can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have 
been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof.  Punitive 
damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote possibility 
of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages 
award.41 
This passage reveals a significant shift from the Court’s prior 
suggestions in Haslip and Gore about the relevance of comparable 
criminal sanctions in determining whether a punitive award is 
unconstitutionally excessive.  The Court’s assertion that criminal penalties 
have “less utility”42 in determining the dollar amount of a punitive award 
possibly was a reaction to the state supreme court’s opinion in Campbell.  
The state court had, in applying the third guidepost and approving the 
$145 punitive award, commented that State Farm’s officers could be 
imprisoned for up to five years, “an extremely important consideration 
for the BMW court.”43  The Supreme Court could also have been 
responding to the practice in some lower courts of validating substantial 
punitive awards in part because the legislature had authorized imprisonment 
for comparable misconduct.44 
Recall, however, that one of the reasons proffered in Gore for 
comparisons to civil and criminal sanctions was that the defendant 
should have notice of the “magnitude of the sanction” that might be 
imposed.45  This statement was made when the only comparable sanctions 
were civil.  Arguably, a legislative authorization of imprisonment, with all 
the stigma, loss of liberty, and financial consequences that are entailed, 
 
 40. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428. 
 41. Id.; see also id. at 417 (“Although these [punitive] awards serve the same 
purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases 
have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.  This 
increases our concerns over the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems 
are administered.”). 
 42. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428. 
 43. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1155 (Utah 2001), 
rev’d, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004). 
 44. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 45. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
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should count as fulfilling the requirement that the defendant—whether 
an individual or an entity—must have notice of the magnitude of the 
sanction that could be imposed.  Moreover, in authorizing imprisonment, 
the legislature might be viewed as indicating that a defendant should not 
be able to violate the law at an economic price.  Haslip, in which the 
Court referenced the possibility of imprisonment in upholding the $1 
million punitive award, supports the idea that an authorization of 
imprisonment might go far to validate a significant punitive award.  
Campbell, however, cast doubt on such a notion, with its language that 
“the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically 
sustain a punitive damages award.”46 
With respect to fines, Campbell seemed to establish a dichotomy that 
has little meaning for the constitutional review of punitive damages.  
Campbell implied that comparisons to criminal penalties are less useful 
than comparisons to civil penalties in determining the constitutional 
maximum of a punitive award.  But legislatures have much leeway in 
labeling an action civil or criminal.47  The Campbell interpretation of the 
third guidepost thus leads to constitutional review that will depend on 
whether the legislature has chosen to label a particular fine as civil or 
criminal.  This is significant, for onerous fines can be imposed under 
civil statutes (and, accordingly, under lesser procedural protections) as 
well as under criminal statutes.48 
 
 46. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428. 
 47. The Supreme Court, when determining which procedural protections apply 
when the government brings an action, generally has deferred to the legislature’s 
denomination of a remedy or sanction as civil or criminal.  See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (stating in a case involving the Ex Post Facto Clause: “[b]ecause we 
‘ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent . . . ‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice 
to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty.’”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, Doe v. Tandeske, 125 S. Ct. 
56 (2004); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260–65 (2001) (holding that statutory 
commitment scheme for sexually violent predators was civil based on legislative intent), 
cert. denied, Turay v. Seling, 125 S. Ct. 181 (2004); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. 321, 327–34 (1998) (reading legislation as indicating forfeiture was a criminal 
sanction and thus holding that Excessive Fines Clause of the Constitution applies). 
 48. Several articles address problems of the divide between civil and criminal 
punishment.  See generally, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil 
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the 
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991); Susan R. Klein, 
Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679 (1999); Kenneth 
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 
101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992); Stephen R. McAllister, A Pragmatic Approach to the Eighth 
Amendment and Punitive Damages, 43 KAN. L. REV. 761 (1995); Carol S. Steiker, 
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The Supreme Court’s caution against using “the civil process to assess 
criminal penalties”49 is curious.  The Court seemed to be suggesting that 
if a punitive award is equivalent to, or greater than, a criminal sanction, 
then the civil process has in effect assessed a criminal penalty.  But mere 
equivalence between the amount of a punitive award and a criminal fine 
should not be seen as converting punitive damages into a criminal 
penalty.  An award of punitive damages does not have the stigma of a 
criminal conviction, nor does it implicate imprisonment.  A private 
party, rather than the state, may seek the punishment.50  Perhaps these 
differences account for why the Supreme Court prior to Campbell had 
stopped short of calling a punitive award a criminal penalty.51  That 
punitive damages have punishment and deterrence as their aim may 
suggest that greater procedural protections should be guaranteed the 
defendant.  But concerns about whether adequate procedures have been 
afforded the defendant are distinct from whether a punitive award is 
unconstitutionally excessive.  On the precise question of excessiveness, 
the Supreme Court in Campbell did not offer persuasive reasons as to 
why, if the third guidepost continues to have validity, criminal penalties 
are not as relevant as civil penalties. 
II.  SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE                                     
THIRD GUIDEPOST 
The third guidepost generally has been criticized in court opinions and 
legal commentary.52  Many have argued that comparison of punitive 
awards to statutory sanctions is unwarranted because the existing 
sanctions often are not a sufficient deterrent to unlawful conduct, either 
because the sanctions are too meager, the statutes are out-of-date, or 
 
Foreword, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997). 
 49. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428. 
 50. Cf. Klein, supra note 48, at 691: 
[T]he framers wished to protect individuals from the government, not from 
private parties and juries of their peers.  On the other hand, when the 
government attempts to punish an individual in a civil forum, it should give us 
pause, as our federal Constitution guarantees certain procedural protections to 
defendants in criminal trials. 
 51. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (describing 
punitive damages as “quasi-criminal”); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (saying that punitive damages “operate as ‘private fines’ 
intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing”); BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) (stating that a $2 million punitive award was 
“tantamount” to a severe criminal penalty). 
 52. See, e.g., Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., 49 P.3d 662, 
672 (N.M. 2002) (“Our own cases have expressed a dissatisfaction with the comparison 
urged by the third guidepost.”). 
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prosecutors have not enforced existing statutes.53  The criticism in essence 
suggests that a defendant should not be able to violate the plaintiff’s 
rights simply because the defendant is willing to “pay the price” of 
existing legislative sanctions.54  One response to this criticism is that 
even if comparison to legislative sanctions in theory would cap the 
amount of punitive damages that are constitutionally acceptable, the 
prospect of compensatory damages serves as an additional deterrent 
beyond the sanctions authorized by the legislature. 
The law of contempt, however, supports an argument that the third 
guidepost is flawed.  In criminal contempt, court-fashioned sanctions 
may exceed sanctions provided by the legislature.  When a person or 
entity engages in conduct that violates not only a statute but also an 
injunction proscribing that conduct, the criminal contempt sanction may 
legitimately exceed the statutory penalties.55  Although one justification 
for this possibility is that the contempt sanction vindicates the authority 
 
 53. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 514 (Ala. 1997) 
(stating that when statutory penalties for comparable misconduct are meager, “a 
consideration of the statutory penalty does little to aid in a meaningful review of the 
excessiveness of the punitive damages award”); Rhein v. ADT Auto., Inc., 930 P.2d 783, 
791 (N.M. 1996) (suggesting that compensatory damages and criminal sanctions may not 
be sufficient to deter an employer from illegally discharging an employee); Kimberly A. 
Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46 
AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1605 (1997) (“[S]tatutory penalties often are outdated and 
obsolete.  Statutory penalties, once fixed, rarely are adjusted for inflation.  In fact, 
punitive damages are generally most beneficial in areas where regulation is unable to 
police or to keep abreast with advancement.”); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The 
Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1329–30 & n.299 (1993) (stating that many large corporations are 
“entities too powerful to be constrained” by remedies provided by “criminal and civil 
law”); Sabrina C. Turner, Note, The Shadow of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 
1998 WIS. L. REV. 427, 461 (“[C]riminal and civil sanctions are often minimal and 
ineffective.  Punitive damages frequently serve to fill that void, and offset weak 
administrative controls.”); cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of California Consumer Health Care 
Council, Inc. at 16–24, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) 
(No. 01-1289), available at 2002 WL 31399608, at *16–24 (arguing that punitive awards 
are necessary because insurance commissions do not have the power to regulate 
insurance companies adequately). 
 54. Cf. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[A] standard principle of penal theory is that ‘the punishment should fit the crime’ in 
the sense of being proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s action, though the 
principle is modified when . . . the crime is potentially lucrative (as in the case of 
trafficking in illegal drugs).”). 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) 
(upholding contempt fines in excess of statutory fines for behavior that violated both the 
statute and an injunction). 
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of the court, distinct from that of the legislature, another justification is 
that the existing statutory sanctions were not adequate to deter the 
defendant from violating the law or to constitute suitable punishment.  A 
court might also order the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for harms 
resulting from the defendant’s violation of the injunction.  The imposition 
of compensatory contempt does not lessen the court’s power to impose a 
criminal contempt sanction in excess of the penalty set by the legislature.  
Thus, the contempt model suggests that a court, in appropriate 
circumstances, should be able to punish and deter in excess of the 
analogous legislative sanction, even when compensation also is awarded. 
Whether comparing punitive awards to statutory sanctions undermines 
deterrence and punishment seems to be a question more of theory than 
practice.  As will be discussed in Part III, courts applying the third 
guidepost typically do not view statutory sanctions for comparable 
misconduct as capping the amount of punitive damages that are 
constitutionally acceptable. 
Another issue arising from the third guidepost is that the conduct 
necessary to trigger the availability of punitive damages may be more 
blameworthy than that which would constitute a violation of a civil or 
criminal statute.  The defendant may have committed a crime or violated 
a civil statute, but without additional evidence of state of mind such as 
willfulness or recklessness or malice toward the plaintiff, the defendant 
will not be liable for punitive damages.56  Arguably, then, statutory 
sanctions are not an appropriate comparison to the amount of punitive 
damages when the punitive award is directed at blameworthiness above 
that which would be covered by the comparable statute.57 
With respect to criminal sanctions in particular, comparisons pose 
additional issues.  The search for a criminal statute that prohibits conduct 
analogous to the defendant’s behavior may be strained.58  When a 
 
 56. For example, issuing fraudulent stock certificates in Rhode Island is a felony 
punishable by up to ten years in prison.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-18-29 (1956).  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court has held that criminal stock fraud does not support an award of 
punitive damages unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by 
malice directed specifically towards the plaintiff.  Sarkisian v. Newpaper, Inc., 512 A.2d 
831, 837 (R.I. 1986). 
 57. In some instances, of course, a court might say that the gap between the conduct 
required for the availability of punitive damages and the conduct made illegal by statute is 
so significant that no comparable statute exists for purposes of the third guidepost. 
 58. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 48, at 795 (“[N]ot all conduct that gives rise to 
liability for punitive damages finds a close counterpart in the criminal law.  Examples 
where this is likely to be true include products liability, medical malpractice and 
defamation, none of which generally involve conduct that is punished criminally.”).  
Moreover, there may be “serious disputes over characterization” as to which statute is most 
analogous.  Id. at 796.  For example, 
[I]t may be difficult to decide in a bad faith case against an insurer who declined 
to pay a claim of the insured whether the insurer’s conduct, if deemed tortious, 
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comparable criminal statute does exist, any authorized term of 
imprisonment raises questions about how to translate the severity of that 
sanction into a constitutionally acceptable level of punitive damages.59 
Having outlined some of the issues arising from the notion that civil 
and criminal statutory sanctions inform whether a punitive award is 
unconstitutionally excessive, it is worth probing how courts have 
implemented the third guidepost with respect to criminal sanctions.  As 
will be demonstrated in the next part, lower court comparisons to 
criminal sanctions, both before and after Campbell, have had varying 
influence in determining the constitutional maximums for punitive 
awards. 
III.   THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF COMPARISONS TO                              
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
In articulating the third guidepost, the Supreme Court has provided 
few details on how comparisons to civil and criminal sanctions should 
affect a court’s review of a punitive award.60  The Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Campbell—describing the $10,000 statutory civil fine as 
being “dwarfed” by the $145 million punitive award but indicating that a 
$1 million punitive award might be constitutional61—seems to give 
courts much leeway.  As the Utah Supreme Court on remand in Campbell 
commented, “somewhere between $1 million and $145 million, the 
difference between the $10,000 civil penalty and the punitive damages 
award becomes so great that the latter ‘dwarfs’ the former.”62  Lower 
courts generally have declined to read the third guidepost as meaning 
that a comparable statutory sanction caps the amount of a constitutionally 
 
should be punished by reference to the State’s general prohibitions on fraudulent 
conduct or rather by focusing on specific provisions in the State’s insurance code 
that might apply to the conduct. 
Id. 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 796 (noting the challenge of “placing a value on the potential 
for imprisonment”); Pace, supra note 53, at 1605–06 (discussing the difficulty of 
translating incarceration into monetary sanctions). 
 60. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 
(D. Ariz. 2003) (“The exact method of application of [the third guidepost] is unclear in 
Gore or Campbell.”). 
 61. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004). 
 62. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2004 WL 869188, at 
*10 (Utah Apr. 23, 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004). 
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acceptable punitive award.63  This leaves room for much variation in 
applications of the third guidepost. 
A.  Cases Before Campbell 
After Haslip but before Campbell, many courts considered the 
comparison of punitive awards to criminal sanctions to be a significant 
aspect of the constitutional review of punitive damages.  One federal 
appellate court inferred from the Supreme Court’s statements that 
criminal sanctions for comparable misconduct were particularly useful in 
determining whether a punitive award was unconstitutionally excessive.64  
A federal trial court in a securities case that upheld a $10 billion 
aggregate punitive award suggested that the mere availability of criminal 
proceedings and injunctive relief “reveals a congressional intent to make 
harsh sanctions available for potential violations.  Even exorbitant 
punitive damage awards are not inconsistent with these potential 
penalties.”65 
In terms of how the courts before Campbell applied the third guidepost 
with respect to criminal sanctions, a variety of approaches emerged.  
Several courts treated a legislative authorization of imprisonment as 
legitimizing a sizeable punitive award.66  Other courts focused solely on 
 
 63. One exception—in the context of a comparison to a civil statutory penalty—is 
Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003).  The court reduced a punitive award of 
$100,000 to the maximum civil penalty of $55,000 under the Fair Housing Act and 
stated: “We simply conclude that in this case a punitive damages award coextensive with 
the statutory maximum civil penalty is reasonable and proportionate to the wrong 
committed.”  Id. at 294. 
 64. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Criminal fines [in 
applying the third guidepost] are particularly informative because punitive damages are 
quasi-criminal.”). 
 65. Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding a $10 
million aggregate punitive damages award imposed by arbitrators and noting that “the 
Arbitrators, in determining the punitive damages award, may have reasonably concluded 
that the previous sanctions imposed upon [the defendant] were ineffectual in 
preventing . . . persistent practices deemed dangerous to the investing public, and that a 
sizeable award might have a deterrent effect”). 
 66. See, e.g., Bielicki v. Terminix Int’l Co., 225 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that “[a]lthough the punitive damages award is exceptional when compared only 
to the applicable fines, the authorization of imprisonment in the criminal context can 
justify a higher award,” and upholding multiple six figure punitive damage awards when 
the comparable legislative sanctions included up to one year imprisonment); Mathie v. 
Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding $500,000 punitive award for sexual 
abuse of inmate in defendant’s custody, when first-degree sodomy was punishable by 
imprisonment of up to twenty-five years); In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 
1067 (D. Alaska 2002) (noting that although “it is not possible to imprison a corporate 
defendant in a criminal case, provision for imprisonment is a recognized legislative 
signal of heightened seriousness of the offense, and therefore, for purposes of the BMW 
analysis, justifies a punitive damages award ‘much in excess of the fine that could be 
imposed’” (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996)); Aken v. 
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the statutory fine for comparable criminal misconduct, ignoring or 
downplaying that the comparable criminal statute also authorized 
imprisonment.67  When courts identified a criminal fine for comparable 
misconduct, they commonly approved punitive awards far in excess of 
the statutory fine.68 
 
Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., 49 P.3d 662, 672–73 (N.M. 2002) 
(stating that “[t]he possibility of a jail sentence justifies a substantial punitive damages 
award,” and upholding combined punitive awards of $2.05 million in wrongful 
termination and defamation case when comparable criminal statute authorized maximum 
fine of $1000 and imprisonment for up to one year); Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 
715 N.E.2d 546, 554–55 (Ohio 1999) (indicating that possibility of involuntary 
manslaughter prosecution against railroad for failing to maintain a safe crossing, 
combined with possible civil penalties, rendered a punitive award of $15 million 
permissible under the third guidepost); Blume v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 963 P.2d 700, 709 
(Or. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that “[a]ssuming that an incarcerative sanction may fairly be 
viewed as some notice of a possibly severe punitive damage for a corporate defendant in 
a somewhat analogous civil action, we agree with plaintiff that a five-year term shows 
the offense to be serious” and upholding a $450,000 punitive award for malicious 
prosecution and false arrest when compensatory damages were $25,000). 
 67. See, e.g., Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540, 546–47 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that punitive damages of $3.5 million failed third guidepost when the maximum criminal 
fine for the defendant’s fraudulent conduct would be $10,000, but failing to mention that 
the statute for comparable misconduct also authorized imprisonment of up to ten years); 
Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1996) (remarking about comparable criminal 
sanctions that “[a] year’s imprisonment is certainly a serious sanction, although the 
maximum fine of $2,000 gives little warning that the offense could entail a $200,000 
[punitive] award” and commenting that “the criminal and civil penalties for comparable 
conduct are middling”); Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 531 (Ala. 1997) (noting that 
the comparable criminal statute provided for up to twenty years imprisonment, but 
concluding that “there is little basis for comparing [the statutory penalty for deceitful 
conduct] with any meaningful punitive damages award” because the comparable 
criminal fines were so low); Mgmt. Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & 
Co., 539 N.W.2d 111, 124–25 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (mentioning that criminal sanctions 
for comparable misconduct include up to $10,000 fine and five year’s imprisonment, but 
focusing on criminal fines in determining that punitive damages more than sixty-five 
times the maximum fine was permissible under due process), aff’d, 557 N.W.2d 67, 80–
83 (Wis. 1996). 
 68. See, e.g., 2660 Woodley Rd. Joint Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 2002-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,601 (D. Del. 2002), available at 2002 WL 53913, *6, *8 (noting in an 
intentional business tort case that the maximum penalty for an analogous crime was 
$10,000 fine and up to five years in prison, and saying that the “guideposts weigh in favor of 
a punitive damages award” to some extent, but that the other guideposts—particularly 
the high compensatory damages of $11 million—required a reduction in the punitive 
award to $17 million), rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.3d 732, 744–45 (3d Cir. 2004); In 
re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire, 795 So. 2d 364, 387 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (In 
class action toxic tort suit in which maximum criminal fine for comparable conduct was 
$1 million, court rejected “the notion that the third guidepost . . . , standing alone, ‘caps’ 
punitive damages in this case” and upheld $850 million punitive damages award under 
other two guideposts.); Mgmt. Computer Servs., Inc., 539 N.W.2d at 124–25 (determining 
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B. Cases After Campbell 
After Campbell’s discussion on permissible ratios between punitive 
and compensatory damages, some courts have all but dispensed with 
considering the third guidepost.69  Courts that have incorporated the third 
guidepost into their constitutional review have varied in their 
consideration of comparable criminal sanctions.  At one extreme, some 
courts have treated the Campbell language as indicating that comparisons to 
criminal penalties are no longer relevant to constitutional review.70  At 
the other extreme, at least one court has considered comparable criminal 
sanctions without confronting the Campbell language on criminal 
penalties.71 
In between these extremes, courts have offered differing interpretations of 
the Campbell language on criminal penalties.  For example, the Seventh 
Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Posner, asserted that an inquiry 
into “the regulatory or criminal penalties to which the defendant exposed 
itself” is “recommended by the Supreme Court,” and it cited for support 
 
that punitive damages award more than sixty-five times the maximum criminal fine was 
permissible under due process), aff’d, 557 N.W.2d at 80–83. 
 69. See, e.g., Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 827–29 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(applying only the first two guideposts in affirming lower court decision that reviewed 
punitive award under all three guideposts); Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. 
Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 759 n.33 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating that “[l]ike the Campbell 
court, ‘we need not dwell long on [the third Gore] guidepost’” and concluding that the 
“marginally analogous statutes” are “not particularly helpful, and the other Gore 
guideposts are sufficient for purposes of our analysis”). 
 70. See, e.g., Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 
605 (Ct. App. 2004) (terming potential criminal penalties to be “of little assistance here” 
in light of Campbell), modified, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 977; Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 
76 P.3d 669, 675–76 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (treating plaintiff’s argument that defendant 
could have been subjected to criminal prosecution as irrelevant in light of the Campbell 
language on criminal comparisons), modified, 79 P.3d 908 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
 71. See, e.g., DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2003).  In DiSorbo, 
decided a few months after Campbell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
compared criminal sanctions to a punitive award without mentioning Campbell’s 
discussion on the issue.  Id.  The jury had assessed punitive damages of $1.275 million 
against a police officer who engaged in acts of police brutality.  Id. at 181.  The comparable 
criminal sanction was a maximum one year sentence of imprisonment and a maximum 
fine of $1000.  Id. at 187–88.  The court commented that “[w]hile a year’s imprisonment 
is undoubtedly a substantial punishment” the maximum fine of $1000 did not give 
adequate warning of the possibility of a punitive award in excess of $1 million.  Id. at 
188.  The appellate court noted, however, that police officers generally are on notice as 
to the gravity of police brutality and thus for purposes of reviewing punitive awards, 
“criminal penalties understate the notice when the misconduct is committed by a police 
officer.”  Id. (citing Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1996)).  The court 
ultimately concluded that a punitive award of $75,000 was appropriate under the Gore 
guideposts, reaching that amount by examining punitive awards against police officers in 
other cases within the Circuit.  Id. at 188–89.  The Second Circuit previously had 
indicated that to determine the appropriate level of punitive damages, a court must look 
to punitive awards in comparable cases.  See Edwards, 101 F.3d at 812. 
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the page of the Campbell opinion that discounts the importance of 
comparisons to criminal penalties.72  By contrast, a California appellate 
court, in a case involving rollover problems with the Ford Bronco, cited 
the same page of Campbell for the proposition that “the failure of 
prosecutors to seek criminal convictions in cases of the present sort does 
not permit an enhancement of the punitive damages award in a civil 
case.”73  Some courts have asserted that Campbell did not prohibit 
consideration of comparable criminal penalties, emphasizing that 
Campbell commented that such penalties reflect the seriousness with 
which the government views the defendant’s wrongful conduct.74 
Other courts have disagreed about the meaning of the specific 
Campbell language that comparisons to criminal sanctions have “less 
utility” in determining the “dollar amount” of a punitive award.  In Eden 
Electrical, Ltd. v. Amana Co.,75 involving a fraud action between two 
business entities, the federal district court noted that, for comparable 
misconduct, a defendant could be sentenced to ten years in prison and 
a maximum criminal fine of $10,000.  It suggested that these penalties 
indicated the seriousness with which the state viewed the conduct and 
that the penalties “support[] a finding of substantial punitive 
damages . . . .”76  Echoing Campbell, however, Eden Electrical commented 
that comparable criminal “penalties shed little light on what amount of 
punitive damages are constitutionally permissible.”77  The court then 
 
 72. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004), as well as other pages in Campbell and BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)). 
 73. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 812 (Ct. App. 2003).  The court, 
without further elaboration, then “conclude[d] the third Gore factor requires neither a 
higher or lower ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages award.”  Id. 
 74. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting defendant’s argument that Campbell prohibits 
comparison to criminal sanctions and quoting Campbell language that “‘[t]he existence 
of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a State views the 
wrongful action’”), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1423 (2004); In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. 
Supp. 2d 1071, 1107 (D. Alaska 2004) (“The potential size of criminal sanctions . . . tells 
us that Alaska (and Federal) authorities view oil spills as very serious . . . .”); Bardis v. 
Oates, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“Although we are aware that 
defendants’ conduct has not been adjudicated in a criminal proceeding, we take note of 
these penalties as reflective of ‘the seriousness with which [our] State views the 
wrongful action.’” (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428)). 
 75. 258 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Iowa 2003), aff’d, 370 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 972. 
 77. Id. 
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proceeded to determine that the punitive award was unconstitutionally 
excessive under the other two guideposts and to order a reduction in the 
award from $18 million to $10 million.78  Thus, in Eden Electrical, the 
federal district court indicated that the punitive award needed to be 
reduced despite its finding that comparable criminal sanctions justified a 
substantial punitive award. 
By contrast, in Trinity Evangelical v. Tower Insurance Co.,79 the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin apparently viewed a $10,000 maximum 
criminal fine as supporting a lesser award than the first two guideposts 
would support.  The court upheld a punitive award of $3.5 million in a 
bad faith action against an insurance company, observing that the 
defendant’s unlawful conduct was quite reprehensible because it was 
repetitive and that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages in the case was an acceptable 7 to 1.80  The court suggested that 
the $10,000 maximum criminal penalty for comparable misconduct was 
not as important a factor, citing the Campbell language that a criminal 
penalty has “less utility” when determining whether a punitive award is 
unconstitutionally excessive.81  The dissent criticized this use of the 
Campbell language, stating that “the Court in Campbell was cautioning 
against using the existence of an applicable criminal penalty as grounds 
to sustain a punitive damages award, not the converse.”82  The dissent 
has the better view on this, for certainly Campbell was attempting to 
limit the use of criminal sanctions to legitimize large punitive awards. 
Of the post-Campbell courts that have considered comparable criminal 
sanctions to be relevant under the third guidepost, some have merely cited 
analogous criminal sanctions without any elaboration or comparison to 
the punitive award.83  Other courts have grappled with how to translate a 
 
 78. Id. at 972–75 (reducing award from approximately $18 million to $10 million 
for fraudulent conduct).  Although the court in Eden Electrical reasoned that it could 
reduce the punitive damages outright, rather than offering a remittitur to the plaintiff in 
lieu of a new trial, it is questionable whether the Seventh Amendment permits such 
outright reduction of a punitive award.  Id. at 975.  See generally Colleen P. Murphy, 
Judgment as a Matter of Law on Punitive Damages, 75 TUL. L. REV. 459 (2000) 
(discussing split in the courts on the issue and arguing that the Seventh Amendment does 
not allow outright reduction of a punitive award). 
 79. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.-Freistadt v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 
N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
 80. Id. at 801–03. 
 81. Id. at 803.  The court did not mention that the same statute authorizes 
imprisonment up to three years.  WIS. STAT. § 601.64(4) (1995 & Supp. 2004). 
 82. Trinity, 661 N.W.2d at 812 n.4.  The dissent noted that the ratio of punitive 
damages to the maximum criminal penalty was 350 to 1, and that the punitive award, 
like the $145 million punitive award in Campbell, “dwarfed” the $10,000 fine for 
comparable conduct.  Id. 
 83. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition 
of Life Activists, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064 (D. Or. 2004) (recounting the civil and 
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comparison to possible criminal fines or imprisonment into a numerical 
limit on punitive damages.84 
With respect to criminal fines, several of the post-Campbell cases that 
have made comparisons to criminal sanctions have approved punitive 
awards that far exceeded the analogous fines.85  Thus, many courts, both 
before and after Campbell, have not viewed comparable criminal sanctions 
as capping the amount of a constitutionally permissible punitive award.  
Although the Campbell litigation involved comparison to civil, rather 
than criminal, statutory sanctions, it is interesting to note that the Utah 
Supreme Court on remand approved a punitive award of more than $9 
million—far greater than the statutory fine of $10,000 for comparable 
misconduct.86  The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied the defendant’s 
petition for certiorari.87 
Sometimes, an analogous criminal fine can be so large that it is 
viewed as validating a substantial punitive damages award.  Such is the 
 
criminal penalties available under the applicable statute but comparing the punitive 
award only to the analogous civil penalties); Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 
651, 670 (S.D. 2003) (citing comparable criminal sanctions but drawing no conclusions 
as to their impact on the due process limits of the punitive award). 
 84. See infra notes 85–101 and accompanying text. 
 85. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 
2003) (upholding $186,000 punitive award to each plaintiff when maximum criminal 
fine for comparable misconduct was $2500 and commenting that defendant could be 
subject to revocation of its hotel license, a worse sanction for the defendant than the 
punitive damages award); Stack v. Jaffee, 306 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141–42 (D. Conn. 2003) 
(commenting that a maximum criminal fine of $2000 “gives little warning that a 
comparable civil rights violation could entail a $200,000 punitive award” but finding that 
punitive award of $25,000 would be constitutionally permissible); S. Union Co. v. 
Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105–06 (D. Ariz. 2003) (noting that 
comparable criminal fine would be up to twice the compensatory award, but upholding a 
punitive award that was more than 153 times the amount of the compensatory award); 
Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 972–75 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (finding 
$10 million punitive award constitutionally permissible when maximum criminal fine 
was $10,000), aff’d, 370 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2004); Trinity, 661 N.W.2d at 803 (upholding 
$3.5 million punitive award when comparable criminal sanction was $10,000). 
 86. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2004 WL 869188, at 
*10 (Utah April 23, 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004).  The state court reasoned: 
[T]he quest to reliably position any misconduct within the ranks of criminal or 
civil wrongdoing based on penalties affixed by a legislature can be quixotic.  
For example, while a $10,000 fine for fraud may appear modest in relationship 
to a multi-million dollar punitive damages award, it is identical to the 
maximum fine which may be imposed on a person in Utah for the commission 
of a first degree felony, the classification assigned our most serious crimes. 
Id. at *10. 
 87. 2004 WL 2074132 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2004) (No. 04-116). 
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case in the Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation, in which a jury awarded 
punitive damages of $5 billion.  With respect to this award, the case has 
bounced between the federal district court in Alaska and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.88  In the most recent district court 
decision, issued after a remand from the appellate court to reconsider in 
light of Campbell, the district court asserted that the criminal fine against 
Exxon for recklessly spilling crude oil into Prince William Sound could 
have reached $5.1 billion.89  Because the punitive award was less than 
the potential criminal fine, the district court concluded that the punitive 
award did not violate the third guidepost.90  The district court opined that 
the BMW guideposts indicated that the $5 billion was not grossly 
excessive, but it ultimately ordered a remittitur to $4.5 billion because 
the court of appeals had directed the district court to reduce the punitive 
award.91  Although the district court acknowledged that after Campbell, 
“there has been some discussion as to whether comparable criminal 
penalties are still appropriate for consideration under the third guidepost,” it 
asserted that criminal sanctions “are a useful double-check of what 
Exxon reasonably would have understood was the outside limit of 
punishment that it could incur by reckless conduct.”92 
At least one court after Campbell has chosen a punitive award that 
was far less than the analogous criminal fine.93  A bankruptcy judge, 
 
 88. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246–47 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating $5 
billion punitive damages award and remanding so that “the district court can set a lower 
amount in light of the BMW and Cooper Industries standards”); In re Exxon Valdez, 236 
F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002) (on remand from appellate court decision 
reported at 270 F.3d 1215, ordering remittitur from $5 billion jury award of punitive 
damages to a reduced amount of $4 billion); Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 
Nos. 30-35166 & 03-32519, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18219, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 
2003) (vacating district court judgment reported at 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043 and remanding 
for reconsideration of amount of punitive damages in light of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 
(2004)); In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110–11 (D. Alaska 2004) (on remand 
from appellate court decision reported at 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18219, ordering remittitur 
from $5 billion jury award of punitive damages to reduced amount of $4.5 billion). 
 89. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–09.  This district court opinion 
restated much of the third guidepost discussion contained in the earlier district court 
opinion reported in 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1065–67. 
 90. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–10. 
 91. Id. at 1110.  Ironically, in its earlier opinion on remand from the Ninth Circuit 
for reconsideration in light of BMW and Cooper Industries, the district court had ordered 
a greater remittitur of the punitive award, to $4 billion.  See In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1068–69.  In both opinions, the district court asserted that the $5 billion 
award was not unconstitutionally excessive, but explained that it was reducing the award 
because the appellate court had directed it to do so.  See In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 
2d at 1110; In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1068–69. 
 92. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. 
 93. In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 291 B.R. 727, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2003), aff’d, 312 B.R. 849 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
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imposing punitive damages in the first instance, assessed $2 million 
against a creditor who had petitioned for involuntary bankruptcy in bad 
faith.  The judge stated that this award was the “minimum punitive damage 
amount that will address the dual purposes of adequate deterrence and 
punishment.”94  Before announcing the punitive award, the judge reviewed 
the Gore factors and noted that the maximum criminal fine for comparable 
conduct was over $8 million.95  Because the judge in the first instance 
assessed the amount of punitive damages, this case arose in a different 
procedural posture than the other cases discussed here, where courts 
reviewed existing punitive awards for unconstitutional excessiveness. 
Aside from the relevance of criminal fines, there is the question of 
how a statutory authorization of imprisonment for comparable misconduct 
should affect constitutional review of punitive awards after Campbell.  
As with pre-Campbell cases, some courts have treated the possibility of 
imprisonment for comparable misconduct as supporting the constitutional 
validity of a substantial punitive award.96  In the district court’s most 
recent opinion on punitive damages in the Exxon Valdez litigation, the 
court stated that “provision for imprisonment is a recognized legislative 
signal of heightened seriousness of the offense, and therefore, for 
purposes of the constitutional analysis, justifies a punitive damages 
award ‘much in excess of the fine that could be imposed.’”97  One state 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  Before settling on a dollar amount for the punitive award, the court first 
discussed the traditional factors that bear on awarding punitive damages in bankruptcy 
proceedings and then described the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on “the 
reasonableness of punitive damage awards in the context of constitutional due process 
and fair notice considerations.”  Id. at 737. 
 96. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (discussing possible regulatory and criminal penalties for the defendant’s 
misconduct, including imprisonment, and commenting that while “a corporation 
cannot be sent to prison,” the criminal sanctions were “just the beginning” of the 
court’s consideration of the regulatory and criminal penalties to which the defendant 
exposed itself); Bardis v. Oates, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 107 (Ct. App. 2004) (in 
discussing civil and criminal penalties for like conduct, mentioning possibility of 
imprisonment and stating that “[a]lthough we are aware that defendants’ conduct 
has not been adjudicated in a criminal proceeding, we take note of these penalties as 
reflective of ‘the seriousness with which [our] State views the wrongful action’”) 
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003), 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004)); Alabama v. Exxon Corp., No. 99-2368 
(Montgomery Cty. Cir. Ct., Ala. Mar. 29, 2004) (finding that a punitive award of 
$3.5 billion would be consistent with constitutional constraints and, in its discussion 
of comparable civil and criminal sanctions, noting that “Exxon or its executives 
could . . . have faced criminal penalties up to and including imprisonment”). 
 97. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
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supreme court equated possible imprisonment with a precise dollar 
amount.  In Alfa Life Insurance Corp. v. Jackson,98 the Alabama Supreme 
Court found that a jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $5 
million was unconstitutionally excessive, and it likewise invalidated the 
district judge’s reduced award of $1.5 million.99  Finding that the 
reprehensibility and ratio guideposts supported a $300,000 punitive 
damages award, the court turned to the third guidepost.100  Noting that a 
criminal statute for comparable misconduct authorized imprisonment for 
two to twenty years, the court asserted that while imprisonment in the 
upper part of the range “might not equate with a punitive-damages 
award of $5,000,000 or $1,500,000, it at least equates with a punitive-
damages award of $300,000.”101 
Thus, while some courts after Campbell have dispensed with the third 
guidepost generally or have determined that comparable criminal penalties 
are no longer relevant, many courts have continued the practices existing 
before Campbell.  Both before and after Campbell, some courts have treated 
the authorization of imprisonment for comparable misconduct as a factor 
legitimating large punitive awards.  Moreover, courts continue to approve 
punitive awards that far exceed analogous criminal fines, indicating that 
comparisons to statutory fines often have little practical effect. 
CONCLUSION 
It is debatable whether review for constitutional excessiveness of a 
punitive award should be guided by comparisons to civil and criminal 
statutory sanctions.  To the extent that comparative review based on 
statutory sanctions—despite its theoretical and practical shortcomings—
continues, criminal sanctions should play no less of a role than civil 
sanctions.  Campbell did not present a persuasive case for why criminal 
sanctions are less relevant than civil sanctions, and its language should 
not be read as foreclosing a court, in an appropriate case, from finding 
that the severity of an analogous criminal sanction may validate a large 
punitive award. 
 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996), which in turn quotes Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)). 
 98. Nos. 1001854 & 1002002, 2004 WL 1009367 (Ala. May 7, 2004). 
 99. Id. at *14. 
 100. Id. at *12–14. 
 101. Id. at *14. 
